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Abstract
Data outsourcing is a growing business model offering services to individuals and enterprises for processing and storing a huge
amount of data. It is not only economical but also promises higher availability, scalability, and more effective quality of service
than in-house solutions. Despite all its benefits, data outsourcing raises serious security concerns for preserving data confidentiality.
There are solutions for preserving confidentiality of data while supporting search on the data stored in outsourced environments.
However, such solutions do not support access policies to regulate access to a particular subset of the stored data.
For complex user management, large enterprises employ Role-Based Access Controls (RBAC) models for making access de-
cisions based on the role in which a user is active in. However, RBAC models cannot be deployed in outsourced environments
as they rely on trusted infrastructure in order to regulate access to the data. The deployment of RBAC models may reveal private
information about sensitive data they aim to protect. In this paper, we aim at filling this gap by proposing ESPOONERBAC for enforc-
ing RBAC policies in outsourced environments. ESPOONERBAC enforces RBAC policies in an encrypted manner where a curious
service provider may learn a very limited information about RBAC policies. We have implemented ESPOONERBAC and provided
its performance evaluation showing a limited overhead, thus confirming viability of our approach.
Keywords: Encrypted RBAC, Policy Protection, Sensitive Policy Evaluation, Secure Cloud Storage, Confidentiality;
1. Introduction
In recent years, data outsourcing has become a very attractive
business model. It offers services to individuals and enterprises
for processing and storing a huge amount of data at very low
cost. It promises higher availability, scalability, and more ef-
fective quality of service than in-house solutions. Many sectors
including government and healthcare, initially reluctant to data
outsourcing, are now adopting it [26].
Despite all its benefits, data outsourcing raises serious se-
curity concerns for preserving data confidentiality. The main
problem is that the data stored in outsourced environments are
within easy reach of service providers that could gain unautho-
rised access. There are several solutions for guaranteeing con-
fidentiality of data in outsourced environments. For instance,
solutions as those proposed in [14, 20] offer a protected data
storage while supporting basic search capabilities performed on
the server without revealing information about the stored data.
However, such solutions do not support access policies to regu-
late the access to a particular subset of the stored data.
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1.1. Motivation
Solutions for providing access control mechanisms in out-
sourced environments have mainly focused on encryption tech-
niques that couple access policies with a set of keys, such as
the one described in [11]. Only users possessing a key (or a set
of hierarchy-derivable keys) are authorised to access the data.
The main drawback of these solutions is that security policies
are tightly coupled with the security mechanism, thus incurring
high processing cost for performing any administrative change
for both the users and the policies representing the access rights.
A policy-based solution, such the one described for the Pon-
der language in [29], is more flexible and easy to manage be-
cause it clearly separates the security policies from the enforce-
ment mechanism. However, policy-based access control mech-
anisms are not designed to operate in outsourced environments.
Such solutions can work only when they are deployed and op-
erated within a trusted domain (i.e., the computational environ-
ment managed by the organisation owning the data). If these
mechanisms are outsourced to an untrusted environment, the
access policies that are to be enforced on the server may leak in-
formation on the data they are protecting. As an example, let us
consider a scenario where a hospital has outsourced its health-
care data management services to a third party service provider.
We assume that the service provider is honest-but-curious, sim-
ilar to the existing literature on data outsourcing (such as [13]),
i.e., it is honest to perform the required operations as described
in the protocol but curious to learn information about stored or
Preprint submitted to Elsevier November 8, 2018
exchanged data. In other words, the service provider does not
preserve data confidentiality. A patient’s medical record should
be associated with an access policy in order to prevent an un-
intended access. The data is stored with an access policy. As
an example, let us consider the following access policy: only a
Cardiologist may access the data. From this policy, it is possi-
ble to infer important information about the user’s medical con-
ditions (even if the actual medical record is encrypted). This
policy reveals that a patient could have heart problems. A mis-
behaving service provider may sell this information to banks
that could deny the patient a loan given her health conditions.
Now-a-days, the most widely used security model is Role-
Based Access Controls (RBAC) [31] that makes decision based
on role in which a user is active in [25]. However, the current
variants of RBAC model cannot be deployed in outsourced en-
vironments as they assume a trusted infrastructure in order to
regulate access on data. In RBAC models, RBAC policies may
leak information about the data they aim to protect. Asghar et
al. [1] propose ESPOON that aims at enforcing authorisation
policies in outsourced environments. They extend ESPOON
[1] to support RBAC policies and role hierarchies [3]. How-
ever, they consider that the role assignment is performed by the
Company RBAC Manager, which is run in the trusted environ-
ment.
1.2. Research Contributions
In this paper, we present an RBAC mechanism for outsourced
environments where we support full confidentiality of RBAC
policies. We named our solution ESPOONERBAC (Enforcing Se-
curity Policies in OutsOurced envirOnmeNts with Encrypted
RBAC). One of the main advantages of ESPOONERBAC is that
we maintain the clear separation between RBAC policies and
the actual enforcing mechanism without loss of policies con-
fidentiality under the assumption that the service provider is
honest-but-curious. Our approach allows enterprises to out-
source their RBAC mechanisms as a service with all the benefits
associated with this business model without compromising the
confidentiality of RBAC policies. Summarising, the research
contributions of our approach are threefold. First, the service
provider does not learn anything about RBAC policies and the
requester’s attributes during the policy deployment or evalua-
tion processes. Second, ESPOONERBAC is capable of handling
complex contextual conditions (a part of RBAC policies) in-
volving non-monotonic boolean expressions and range queries.
Third, the system entities do not share any encryption keys and
even if a user is deleted or revoked, the system is still able
to perform its operations without requiring re-encryption of
RBAC policies. As a proof-of-concept, we have implemented
a prototype of our RBAC mechanism and analysed its perfor-
mance to quantify the overhead incurred by cryptographic op-
erations used in the proposed scheme.
1.3. Organisation
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 re-
views the related work. Section 3 provides an overview of
RBAC models. Section 4 presents the proposed architecture
of ESPOONERBAC. Section 5 and Section 6 focus on solution
details and algorithmic details, respectively. Section 7 provides
security analysis of ESPOONERBAC. Section 8 analyses the per-
formance overhead of ESPOONERBAC. Finally, Section 9 con-
cludes this paper and gives directions for the future work.
2. Related Work
Work on outsourcing data storage to a third party has been
focusing on protecting the data confidentiality within the out-
sourced environment. Several techniques have been proposed
allowing authorised users to perform efficient queries on the
encrypted data while not revealing information on the data and
the query [33, 7, 15, 10, 18, 8, 35, 5, 28, 32, 14]. However,
these techniques do not support the case of users having dif-
ferent access rights over the protected data. Their assumption
is that once a user is authorised to perform search operations,
there are no restrictions on the queries that can be performed
and the data that can be accessed.
The idea of using an access control mechanism in an out-
sourced environment was initially explored in [12, 13]. In this
approach, Vimercati et al. provide a selective encryption strat-
egy for enforcing access control policies. The idea is to have a
selective encryption technique where each user has a different
key capable of decrypting only the resources a user is autho-
rised to access. In their scheme, a public token catalogue ex-
presses key derivation relationships. However, the public cata-
logue contains tokens in the clear that express the key derivation
structure. The tokens could leak information on access control
policies and on the protected data. To circumvent the issue of
information leakage, in [11] Vimercati et al. provide an encryp-
tion layer to protect the public token catalogue. This requires
each user to obtain the key for accessing a resource by travers-
ing the key derivation structure. The key derivation structure is
a graph built (using access key hierarchies [4]) from a classical
access matrix. There are several issues related to this scheme.
First, the algorithm of building key derivation structure is very
time consuming. Any administrative actions to update access
rights require the users to obtain new access keys derived from
the rebuilt key derivation structure and it consequently requires
data re-encryption with new access keys. Therefore, the scheme
is not very scalable and may be suitable for a static environment
where users and resources do not change very often. Second,
the scheme does not support complex policies where contex-
tual information may be used for granting access rights. For
instance, only specific time and location information associated
with an access request may be legitimate to grant access to a
user.
Another possible approach for implementing an access con-
trol mechanism is protecting the data with an encryption
scheme where the keys can be generated from the user’s creden-
tials (expressing attributes associated with that user). Although
these approaches are not devised particularly for outsourced en-
vironments, it is still possible to use them as access control
mechanisms in outsourced settings. For instance, a recent work
by Narayan et al. [23] employ the variant of Attribute Based
Encryption (ABE) proposed in [6] (i.e., Ciphertext Policy ABE,
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or CP-ABE in short) to construct an outsourced healthcare sys-
tem where patients can securely store their Electronic Health
Record (EHR). In their solution, each EHR is associated with a
secure search index to provide search capabilities while guaran-
teeing no information leakage. However, one of the problems
associated with CP-ABE is that the access structure, represent-
ing the security policy associated with the encrypted data, is not
protected. Therefore, a curious storage provider might get in-
formation on the data by accessing the attributes expressed in
the CP-ABE policies. The problem of having the access struc-
ture expressed in cleartext affects in general all the ABE con-
structions [30, 16, 27, 6]. Therefore, this mechanism is not suit-
able for guaranteeing confidentiality of access control policies
in outsourced environments.
Asghar et al. [1] propose ESPOON that aims at enforcing au-
thorisation policies in outsourced environments. In ESPOON,
a data owner (or someone on the behalf of data owners) may
attach an authorisation policy with the data while storing it on
the outsourced server. Any authorised requester may get access
to the data if she satisfies the authorisation policy associated
with that data. However, ESPOON lacks to provide support for
RBAC policies. In [3], Asghar et al. extended ESPOON to sup-
port RBAC policies and role hierarchies. However, in [3] the
role assignment is performed by the Company RBAC Manager,
which is run in the trusted environment. On the other hand,
in our current architecture, the role assignment is performed
by the service provider running in the outsourced environment.
In other words, we have eliminated the need of an additional
online-trusted-server i.e., the Company RBAC Manager.
Related to the issue of the confidentiality of the access struc-
ture, the hidden credentials scheme presented in [17] allows one
to decrypt ciphertexts while the involved parties never reveal
their policies and credentials to each other. Data can be en-
crypted using an access policy containing monotonic boolean
expressions which must be satisfied by the receiver to get ac-
cess to the data. A passive adversary may deduce the policy
structure, i.e., the operators (AND, OR, m-of-n threshold en-
cryption) used in the policy but she does not learn what cre-
dentials are required to fulfill the access policy unless she pos-
sesses them. Bradshaw et al. [9] extend the original hidden
credentials scheme to limit the partial disclosure of the policy
structure and speed up the decryption operations. However, in
this scheme, it is not easy to support non-monotonic boolean
expressions and range queries in the access policy. Last, hidden
credentials schemes assume that the involved parties are online
all the time to run the protocol.
3. Overview of RBAC Models
RBAC [31] is an access control model that logically maps
well to the job-function specified within an organisation. In the
basic RBAC model, a system administrator or a security officer
assigns permissions to roles and then roles are assigned to users.
A user can make an access request to execute permissions cor-
responding to a role only if he or she is active in that role. A
user can be active in a subset of roles assigned to him/her by
making a role activation request. In RBAC, a session keeps
mapping of users to roles that are active.
In [31], Sandhu et al. extend the basic RBAC model with role
hierarchies for structuring roles within an organisation. The
concept of role hierarchy introduces the role inheritance. In the
role inheritance, a derived role can inherit all permissions from
the base role. The role inheritance incurs extra processing over-
head as requested permissions might be assigned to the base
role of one in which the user might be active.
The RBAC model may activate a role or grant permis-
sions while taking into account the context under which the
user makes the access request or the role activation request
[21, 19, 34, 24, 22]. The RBAC model captures this context by
defining contextual conditions. A contextual condition requires
certain attributes about the environment or the user making the
request. These attributes are contextual information, which may
include access time, access date and location of the user who is
making the request. The RBAC model grants the request if the
contextual information satisfy the contextual conditions.
4. The ESPOONERBAC Approach
ESPOONERBAC aims at providing RBAC mechanism that can
be deployed in an outsourced environment. Figure 1 illustrates
the proposed architecture that has similar components to the
widely accepted architecture for the policy-based management
proposed by IETF [36]. In
ESPOONERBAC, an Admin User deploys (i) RBAC policies and
sends them to the Administration Point that stores (ii) RBAC
policies1 in the Policy Store. These policies may include per-
missions assigned to roles, roles assigned to users and the role
hierarchy graph that are stored in the Permission Repository,
the Role Repository and the Role Hierarchy repository, respec-
tively.
A Requester may send (1) the role activation request to the
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). This request includes the Re-
quester’s identifier and the requested role. The PEP forwards
(2) the role activation request to the Policy Decision Point
(PDP). The PDP retrieves (3) the policy corresponding to the
Requester from the Role Repository of the Policy Store and
fetches (4) the contextual information from the Policy Infor-
mation Point (PIP). The contextual information may include
the environmental and Requester’s attributes under which the
requested role can be activated. For instance, consider a contex-
tual condition where a role doctor can only be activated during
the duty hours. For simplicity, we assume that the PIP collects
all required attributes and sends all of them together in one go.
Moreover, we assume that the PIP is deployed in the trusted
environment. However, if attributes forgery is an issue, the PIP
can request a trusted authority to sign the attributes before send-
ing them to the PDP. The PDP evaluates role assignment poli-
cies against the attributes provided by the PIP checking if the
contextual information satisfies contextual conditions and sends
to the PEP (5) the role activation response. In case of permit,
1In the rest of this paper, by term policies we mean RBAC policies.
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Figure 1: The ESPOONERBAC architecture for enforcing RBAC policies in outsourced environments
the PEP activates the requested role by updating the Session
containing the Active Roles repository (6a). Otherwise, in case
of deny, the requested role is not activated. Optionally, a re-
sponse can be sent to the Requester (7) with either success or
failure.
After getting active in a role, a Requester can make the ac-
cess request that is sent to the PEP (1). This request includes
the Requester’s identifier, the requested data (target) and the ac-
tion to be performed. The PEP forwards (2) the access request
to the PDP. After receiving the access request, the PDP first re-
trieves from the Session information about the Requester if she
is already active in any role (3a). If so, the PDP evaluates if the
Requester’s (active) role is permitted to execute the requested
action on the requested data. For this purpose, the PDP retrieves
(3) the permission assignment policy corresponding to the ac-
tive role from the Permission Repository of the Policy Store and
fetches (4) the contextual information from the PIP required for
evaluating contextual conditions in the permission assignment
policy. For instance, consider the example where a Cardiologist
can access the cardiology report during the office hours. The
PDP evaluates the permission assignment policies against the
attributes provided by the PIP checking if the contextual infor-
mation satisfies any contextual conditions and sends to the PEP
(5) the access response. In case of permit, the PEP forwards the
access action to the Data Store (6b). In case if no contextual
condition is satisfied, the PDP retrieves the role hierarchy from
the Role Hierarchy repository of the Policy Store and then tra-
verses this role hierarchy graph in order to find if any base role,
the Requester’s role might be derived from, has permission to
execute the requested action on the requested data. If so, the
PEP forwards the access action to the Data Store (6b). Oth-
erwise, in case of deny, the requested action is not forwarded.
Optionally, a response can be sent to the Requester (7) with
either success or failure.
The main difference with the standard proposed by IETF
is that the ESPOONERBAC architecture is outsourced in an un-
trusted environment (see Figure 1). The trusted environment
comprises only a minimal IT infrastructure that is the appli-
cations used by the Admin Users and Requesters, together
with the PIP. This reduces the cost of maintaining an IT in-
frastructure. Having the reference architecture in the cloud
increases its availability and provides a better load balancing
compared to a centralised approach. In outsourced environ-
ments, ESPOONERBAC guarantees that the confidentiality of
policies is protected not only when they are deployed but also
when they are enforced. This offers a more efficient evaluation
of policies. For instance, a naive solution would see the en-
crypted policies stored in the cloud and the PDP deployed in the
trusted environment. At each evaluation, the encrypted policies
would be sent to the PDP that decrypts the policies for a cleart-
ext evaluation. After that, the policies need to be encrypted and
send back to the cloud. The Service Provider, where the ar-
chitecture is outsourced, is honest-but-curious. This means that
the provider allows the ESPOONERBAC components to follow
the specified protocols, but it may be curious to find out infor-
mation about the data and the policies regulating the accesses
to the data. As for the data, we assume that data confidential-
ity is preserved by one of the several techniques available for
outsourced environments [14, 28, 32]. However, to the best of
our knowledge, no solution exists that addresses the problem of
guaranteeing the policy confidentiality while allowing an effi-
cient evaluation mechanism that is clearly separated from the
policies. Most of the techniques discussed in the related work
section require the security mechanism to be tightly coupled
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if 〈CONDITION〉 then 〈US ER〉 can be active in 〈{R1,R2, . . . ,Rn}〉
Figure 2: RBAC Policy: Role assignment
with the policies. In the following section, we can show that
it is possible to maintain a generic PDP separated from the se-
curity policies and able to take access decisions based on the
evaluation of encrypted policies. In this way, the policy confi-
dentiality can be guaranteed against a curious provider and the
functionality of the access control mechanism is not restricted.
4.1. System Model
Before presenting the detail of the scheme used in
ESPOONERBAC, it is necessary to discuss the system model. In
this section, we identify the following system entities:
• Admin User: This type of user is responsible for the ad-
ministration of policies stored in the outsourced environ-
ment. An Admin User can deploy new policies or up-
date/delete already deployed policies.
• Requester: A Requester is a user that requests an access
(e.g., read, write or search) over the data residing in the
outsourced environment. Before the access is permitted,
policies deployed in the outsourced environment are eval-
uated.
• Service Provider (SP): The SP is responsible for man-
aging the outsourced computation environment, where the
ESPOONERBAC components are deployed and to store the
data, and policies. It is assumed the SP is honest-but-
curious (as [13] does), i.e., it allows the components to fol-
low the protocol to perform the required actions but curi-
ous to deduce information about the exchanged and stored
policies.
• Trusted Key Management Authority (TKMA): The
TKMA is fully trusted and responsible for generating and
revoking the keys. For each type of authorised users (in-
cluding an Admin User and a Requester), the TKMA gen-
erates two key sets and securely transmits the client key
set to the user and the server key set to the Administra-
tion Point. The Administration Point inserts the server side
key set in the Key Store. The TKMA is deployed on the
trusted environment. Although requiring a TKMA seems
at odds with the need of outsourcing the IT infrastructure,
we argue that the TKMA requires less resources and less
management effort. Securing the TKMA is much easier
since a very limited amount of data needs to be protected
and the TKMA can be kept offline most of the time.
It should be clarified that in our settings an Admin User is
not interested in protecting the confidentiality of policies from
other Admin Users and Requesters. Here, the main goal is to
preserve the confidentiality of data and policies from the SP.
if 〈CONDITION〉 then 〈R〉 can execute 〈{(A1,T1), (A2,T2), . . . , (An,Tn)}〉
Figure 3: RBAC Policy: Permission assignment
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Figure 4: An example of contextual condition illustrating Location =
Cardiology-ward and AT > 9#5 and AT < 17#5
4.2. Representation of RBAC Policies/Requests
In this section, we provide details about how to represent
policies and requests used in our approach. An RBAC pol-
icy contains a role assignment policy, a permission policy and
a role hierarchy graph. In the following, we discuss each of
them. Figure 2 illustrates how we represent role assignment
policies in ESPOONERBAC. The meaning of role assignment
policy is as follows: if contextual condition, CONDITION, is
true then US ER can be active in any role(s) out of role set
{R1,R2, . . . ,Rn}. Figure 3 illustrates how we represent permis-
sion assignment policies in ESPOONERBAC. The meaning of
permission assignment policy is as follows: if contextual condi-
tion, CONDITION, is true then role R can execute any permis-
sion(s) out of permission set {(A1,T1), (A2,T2), . . . , (An,Tn)}.
The PDP evaluates contextual conditions of both role assign-
ment and permission assignment policies before granting the
access. In order to evaluate a contextual condition, the PDP
requires contextual information. The contextual information
captures the context in which a Requester makes access or role
activation requests. The PIP collects and sends required contex-
tual information to the PDP. To represent contextual conditions,
we use the tree structure described in [6] for CP-ABE policies.
This tree structure allows an Admin User to express contextual
conditions as conjunctions and disjunctions of equalities and in-
equalities. Internal nodes of the tree structure are AND, OR or
threshold gates (e.g., 2 of 3) and leaf nodes are values of condi-
tion predicates either string or numerical. In the tree structure,
a string comparison is represented by a single leaf node. How-
ever, the tree structure uses the bag of bits representation to
support comparisons between numerical values that could ex-
press time, date, location, age, or any numerical identifier. For
instance, let us consider a contextual condition stating that the
Requester location should be Cardiology-ward and that the ac-
cess time should be between 9:00 and 17:00 hrs. Figure 4 illus-
trates the tree structure representing this contextual condition,
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R1 extends 〈{Ri,Rii, . . . ,Rk1 }〉
R2 extends 〈{Ri,Rii, . . . ,Rk2 }〉
.
.
.
Rn extends 〈{Ri,Rii, . . . ,Rkn }〉
Figure 5: RBAC Policy: Role hierarchy
Cardiologist Assistant
Doctor
Cardiologist
Intern
Figure 6: Role hierarchy graph
where access time (AT) is in a 5-bit representation (#5).
A Requester can make a role activation request ACT or an
access request REQ. In ACT = (i,R), a Requester includes her
identity i along with role R to be activated. After a Requester
is active in R, she can execute permissions assigned to R. For
executing any permission, a Requester sends REQ = (R, A,T )
that includes R she is active in, action A to be taken over target
T . A Requester sends ACT or REQ requests to the PEP.
The PEP receives and forwards requests ACT or REQ
to the PDP. The PDP fetches policies corresponding to re-
quests from the Policy Store. The PDP may require con-
textual information in order to evaluate contextual conditions
to grant ACT or REQ. Let us consider CONDITION illus-
trated in Figure 4 requiring location of Requester and ac-
cess time. We assume the Requester makes the request when
she is in Cardiology-ward and access time (AT) is 10:00 hrs.
The PIP collects and then transforms this contextual informa-
tion as follows: Location = Cardiology-ward, AT : 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗,
AT : ∗1 ∗ ∗∗, AT : ∗ ∗ 0 ∗ ∗, AT : ∗ ∗ ∗1∗,
AT : ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 0, where AT is in a 5-bit representation (same as
it is in CONDITION). After performing transformation, the
PIP sends contextual information to the PDP. The PDP re-
ceives contextual information and then evaluates CONDITION
by first matching attributes in contextual information against
leaf-nodes in the CONDITION tree and then evaluating inter-
nal nodes according to AND and OR gates.
The ESPOONERBAC architecture supports role inheritance. In
role inheritance, a derived role can execute all permissions from
its base role. Before denying REQ, the PDP may need to check
if base role of one in REQ can execute requested permissions.
In order to find base roles, we store a role hierarchy graph on the
SP. In ESPOONERBAC, the PDP traverses in the role hierarchy
graph to find base roles. Figure 5 illustrates how we represent
a role hierarchy graph. In Figure 5, each line represents a role
that may extend a set of roles. All these inheritance rules may
form a role hierarchy graph. For instance, consider an example
from healthcare domain where a Cardiologist Assistant extends
Intern, a Doctor extends Intern and finally a Cardiologist ex-
tends both Cardiologist Assistant and Doctor. If we combine
all these inheritance rules then it can form a graph as shown in
Figure 6.
In this representation, leaf-nodes in CONDITION, R, A, T
of both ACT and REQ, roles in the role hierarchy graph, and
attributes in contextual information are in cleartext. Therefore,
such information is easily accessible in the outsourced envi-
ronment and may leak information about the data that policies
protect. In the following, we show how we protect such rep-
resentation while allowing the PDP to evaluate policies against
requests and contextual information.
5. Solution Details
ESPOONERBAC aims at enforcing policies in outsourced en-
vironments. The main idea of our approach is to use an
encryption scheme for preserving confidentiality of policies
while allowing the PDP to perform the correct evaluation. In
ESPOONERBAC, we can notice that the operation performed by
the PDP for evaluating policies (against attributes in the request
and contextual information) is similar to the search operation
executed in a database. In particular, in our case the policy is a
query; while, attributes in the request (ACT or REQ) and con-
textual information represent the data.
For ESPOONERBAC, as a starting point we consider the mul-
tiuser Searchable Data Encryption (SDE) scheme proposed by
Dong et al. in [14]. The SDE scheme allows an untrusted server
to perform searches over encrypted data without revealing to the
server information on both the data and elements used in the re-
quest. The advantage of this method is that it offers multi-user
access without requiring key sharing between users. Each user
in the system has a unique set of keys. The data encrypted by
one user can be decrypted by any other authorised user. How-
ever, the SDE implementation in [14] is only able to perform
keyword comparison based on equalities. One of the major
extensions of our implementation is that we are able to sup-
port the evaluation of contextual conditions containing complex
boolean expressions such as non-conjunctive and range queries
in multi-user settings.
In general, we distinguish four phases in ESPOONERBAC for
managing life cycle of policies in outsourced environments.
These phases include initialisation, policy deployment, policy
evaluation and user revocation. In the following, we provide
details of each phase.
5.1. Initialisation Phase
In ESPOONERBAC, each user (including an Admin User and a
Requester) obtains a client side key from the TKMA while the
SP (as a proxy server) receives a server side key set correspond-
ing to the user. The client side key set serves as a private key
for a user. The SP stores all key sets in the Key Store. The Key
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Store is accessible to the Administration Point, the PEP and the
PDP.
5.2. Policy Deployment Phase
For deploying (or updating existing) policies, an Admin User
performs a first round of encryption using her client side key
set. An Admin User encrypts elements of policies. In role as-
signment policies, an Admin User encrypts all roles assigned
to a user. In permission assignment policies, an Admin User
encrypts both action and target parts of each permission and
also encrypts the role to which these permissions are assigned.
As we know that a tree represents condition conditions of both
role assignment and permission assignment policies (as shown
in Figure 4), an Admin User encrypts each leaf node of the
tree while non-leaf (internal) nodes representing AND, OR or
threshold gates are in cleartext. In a role hierarchy graph (as
shown in Figure 6), an Admin User encrypts each of its node
representing a role. After completing the first round of encryp-
tion on policies, an Admin User sends client encrypted policies
to the Administration Point on the SP. These client encrypted
policies are protected but cannot be enforced as these are not in
common format. To convert client encrypted policies to com-
mon format, the Administration Point performs a second round
of encryption using server side key set corresponding to the Ad-
min User. The second round of encryption serves as a proxy
re-encryption. In the second round of encryption, the Adminis-
tration Point encrypts all elements that are encrypted in the first
round of encryption. Finally, the Administration Point stores
server encrypted policies in the Policy Store.
5.3. Policy Evaluation Phase
A Requester can make a role activation request ACT . Before
sending ACT to the SP, a Requester generates a client trapdoor
of the role in ACT . A Requester generates client trapdoor us-
ing her client side key set. The trapdoor representation does
not leak information on elements of requests. Similarly, a Re-
quester can make an access request REQ after getting active in a
role. A Requester generates a client trapdoor for each element
in REQ including the role, the action and the target. A Re-
quester sends requests containing client generated trapdoors to
the PEP on the SP. The PEP performs another round of trapdoor
generation for converting all trapdoors into a common format.
After performing a second round of trapdoor generation on the
server side, the PEP forwards server generated trapdoors to the
PDP. The PDP fetches policies from the Policy Store and then
performs encrypted matching of trapdoors in request against
encrypted elements in policies. The encrypted matching in out-
sourced environments does not leak information about elements
of requests or policies.
The PDP may require contextual information in order to eval-
uate the contextual conditions of policies. The PIP collects con-
textual information and generates client trapdoors for elements
of contextual information using her client side key set. The PIP
sends client generated trapdoors of contextual information to
the PDP. The PDP performs another round of trapdoor genera-
tion using server side key set corresponding to the PIP. Finally,
the PDP evaluates the contextual condition by matching trap-
doors of contextual information against encrypted leaf nodes
of the tree representing the contextual condition (as shown in
Figure 4). After evaluating leaf nodes, the PDP evaluates non-
leaf nodes of the tree based on AND, OR and threshold gates.
The PDP grants the access request if (the root node of) the tree
evaluates to true.
The PDP may need to find base roles corresponding to the
role in REQ considering the fact that a derived role has all per-
missions from its base role. In order to find base role, the PDP
fetches the role hierarchy graph from the Policy Store. The PDP
matches trapdoor of role in REQ against server encrypted roles
in the role hierarchy graph. While deploying the role hierar-
chy graph, we store also server generated trapdoor of the role
along with each server encrypted of role because the PDP needs
a trapdoor of each base role so that it can match this trapdoor
against roles in the Permission Repository. After traversing in
the role hierarchy graph, the PDP extracts server generated trap-
doors of all base roles of one that matches with trapdoor of role
in REQ. The PDP verifies if any base role has requested per-
missions. If so, the PDP grants the request.
5.4. User Revocation Phase
In ESPOONERBAC, users do not share any keys and a com-
promised user can be revoked without requiring re-encryption
of policies or re-distribution of keys. For revoking a compro-
mised user, the Administration Point removes the server side
key set (corresponding to the user) from the Key Store.
Algorithm 1 Init
Input: A security parameter 1k .
Output: The public parameters param and the master secret key msk.
1: Generate primes p and q of size 1k such that q | p − 1
2: Create a generator g such that G is the unique order q subgroup of Z∗p
3: Choose a random x ∈ Z∗q
4: h← gx
5: Choose a collision-resistant hash function H
6: Choose a pseudorandom function f
7: Choose a random key s for f
8: param← (G, g, q, h,H, f )
9: msk ← (x, s)
10: return (param,msk)
6. Algorithmic Details
In this section, we provide details of algorithms used in each
phase for managing life cycle of policies. All these algorithms
constitute the proposed schema.
6.1. Initialisation Phase
In this phase, the system is initialised and then the
TKMA generates required keying material for entities in
ESPOONERBAC. During the system initlisation, the TKMA
takes a security parameter k and outputs the public parameters
params and the master key set msk by running Init illustrated
in Algorithm 1. The detail of Init is as follows: the TKMA
generates two prime numbers p and q of size k such that q di-
vides p − 1 (Line 1). Then, it creates a cyclic group G with a
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Figure 7: Key distribution
generator g such that G is the unique order q subgroup of Z∗p
(Line 2). Next, it randomly chooses x ∈ Z∗q (Line 3) and com-
pute h as gx (Line 4). Next, it chooses a collision-resistant hash
function H (Line 5), a pseudorandom function f (Line 6) and
a random key s for f (Line 7). Finally, it publicises the pub-
lic parameters params = (G, g, q, h,H, f ) (Line 8) and keeps
securely the master secret key msk = (x, s) (Line 9).
Algorithm 2 KeyGen
Input: The master secret key msk, the user identity i and the public parameters params.
Output: The client side key set Kui and server side key set Ksi .
1: Choose a random xi1 ∈ Z∗q
2: xi2 ← x − xi1
3: Kui ← (xi1, s)
4: Ksi ← (i, xi2)
5: return (Kui ,Ksi )
For each user (including an Admin User and a Requester),
the TKMA generates the keying material. For generating the
keying material, the TKMA takes the master secret key msk,
the user identity i and the public parameters params and out-
puts two key sets: the client side key set Kui and the server side
key set Ksi by running KeyGen illustrated in Algorithm 2. In
KeyGen, TKMA randomly chooses xi1 ∈ Z∗q (Line 1) and com-
putes xi2 = x − xi1 (Line 2). It creates the client side key set
Kui = (xi1, s) (Line 3) and the server side key set Ksi = (i, xi2)
(Line 4).
After running Algorithm 2, the TKMA sends the client side
key set Kui and the server side key set Ksi to user i and the
Administration Point on the SP, respectively. The client side
key set Kui serves as a private key for user i. The Administra-
tion Point of the SP inserts Ksi in the Key Store by updating
it as follows: KS = KS ∪ Ksi . The Key Store is initialised
as: KS ← φ. Figure 7 illustrates key distribution where Ad-
min User A, Requester R and PIP P receive KuA , KuR and KuP ,
respectively. The TKMA sends the corresponding server side
key sets KsA , KsR and KsP to the Administration Point on the SP.
The Administration Point inserts server side key sets into the
Key Store. Please note that only the Administration Point, the
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Figure 8: Policy deployment phase
PDP and the PEP are authorised to access the Key Store.
Algorithm 3 ClientEnc
Input: Element e, the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i and the public
parameters params.
Output: The client encrypted element c∗i (e).
1: Choose a random re ∈ Z∗q
2: σe ← fs(e)
3: cˆ1 ← gre+σe
4: cˆ2 ← cˆxi11
5: cˆ3 ← H(hre )
6: c∗i (e)← (cˆ1, cˆ2, cˆ3)
7: return c∗i (e)
Algorithm 4 ServerReEnc
Input: The client encrypted element c∗i (e) and the server side key set Ksi corresponding
to Admin User i.
Output: The server encrypted element c(e).
1: c1 ← (cˆ1)xi2 .cˆ2 = cˆxi1+xi21 = (gre+σe )x = hre+σe
2: c2 = cˆ3 = H(hre )
3: c(e) = (c1, c2)
4: return c(e)
6.2. Policy Deployment Phase
In the policy deployment phase, an Admin User defines and
deploys policies. In general, a policy can be deployed after per-
forming two rounds of encryptions. An Admin User performs
a first round of encryption while the Administration Point on
the SP performs a second round of encryption. For perform-
ing a first round of encryption, an Admin User runs ClientEnc
illustrated in Algorithm 3. ClientEnc takes as input (policy)
element e, the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin
User i and the public parameters params and outputs the client
encrypted element c∗i (e). In ClientEnc, an Admin User ran-
domly chooses re ∈ Z∗q (Line 1), computes σe as fs(e) (Line 2),
and then computes cˆ1, cˆ2 and cˆ3 as gre+σe (Line 3), cˆ
xi1
1 (Line 4)
and H(hre ) (Line 5), respectively. cˆ1, cˆ2 and cˆ3 constitute c∗i (e)
(Line 6). An Admin User transmits to the Administration Point
the client encrypted elements of a policy as shown in Figure 8.
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The Administration Point retrieves the server side key set
corresponding to the Admin User and performs a second round
of encryption by running ServerReEnc illustrated in Algorithm
4. ServerReEnc takes as input the client encrypted element
c∗i (e) and the server side key set Ksi corresponding to Admin
User i and outputs the server encrypted element c(e). The Ad-
ministration Point calculates c1 and c2 as (cˆ1)xi2 .cˆ2 = cˆ
xi1+xi2
1 =
(gre+σe )x = hre+σe (Line 1) and cˆ3 = H(hre ) (Line 2), respec-
tively. Both c1 and c2 form c(e) (Line 3). The Administration
Point stores the server encrypted policies in the Policy Store as
shown in Figure 8.
In the following, we describe how to deploy different (parts
of) policies including role assignment, permission assignment,
contextual conditions and role hierarchy graph. For the deploy-
ment of each (part of) policy, we follow general strategy as al-
ready described in this section and also illustrated in Figure 8.
Algorithm 5 RoleAssignment:ClientSide
Input: List of roles L to be assigned to Requester j, the client side key set Kui correspond-
ing to Admin User i and the public parameters params.
Output: The client encrypted role assignment list LCi .
1: LCi ← φ
2: for each role r in list L do
3: c∗i (r)← call ClientEnc (r, Kui , params) {see Algorithm 3}
4: LCi ← LCi ∪ c∗i (r)
5: end for
6: return ( j, LCi )
Algorithm 6 RoleAssignment:ServerSide
Input: The client encrypted role assignment list LCi for Requester j and identity i of
Admin User.
Output: The server encrypted role assignment list LS .
1: Ksi ← KS [i] {retrieve the server side key corresponding to Admin User i}
2: LS ← φ
3: for each client encrypted role c∗i (r) in list LCi do
4: c(r)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (r), Ksi ) {see Algorithm 4}
5: LS ← LS ∪ c(r)
6: end for
7: return ( j, LS )
Deployment of Role Assignment Policies: In order to assign
roles to a Requester, an Admin User can deploy role assignment
policies. For this purpose, an Admin User runs RoleAssign-
ment:ClientSide illustrated in Algorithm 5. This algorithm
takes as input a list of roles L to be assigned to Requester j,
the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i and
the public parameters params and outputs the client encrypted
role assignment list LCi . First, it creates and then initialises
new list LCi (Line 1). For each role in L (Line 2), it gener-
ates client encrypted role by calling ClientEnc illustrated in
Algorithm 3 (Line 3) and then it updates LCi by adding client
encrypted role (Line 4). An Admin User sends the client en-
crypted role assignment list to the Administration Point. During
the second round of encryption, the Administration Point runs
RoleAssignment:ServerSide illustrated in Algorithm 6. This
algorithm takes as input the client encrypted role assignment
list LCi for Requester j and identity i of Admin User and ouputs
the server encrypted role assignment list LS . While running
RoleAssignment:ServerSide, the Administration Point first re-
trieves the server side key Ksi corresponding to Admin User i
(Line 1). It creates and initialises new list LS (Line 2). For
each role in LCi (Line 3), it generates server encrypted role by
calling ServerReEnc illustrated in Algorithm 4 (Line 4) and
updates LS by adding the server encrypted role (Line 5).
Algorithm 7 PermissionAssignment:ClientSide
Input: List of permissions L to be assigned to role r, the client side key set Kui corre-
sponding to Admin User i and the public parameters params.
Output: The client encrypted permission assignment list LCi assigned to the client gener-
ated role c∗i (r).
1: c∗i (r)← call ClientEnc (r, Kui , params)
2: LCi ← φ
3: for each permission (action, target) in L do
4: c∗i (action)← call ClientEnc (action, Kui , params)
5: c∗i (target)← call ClientEnc (target, Kui , params)
6: LCi ← LCi ∪ (c∗i (action), c∗i (target))
7: end for
8: return (c∗i (r), LCi )
Algorithm 8 PermissionAssignment:ServerSide
Input: The client encrypted permission assignment list LCi for client generated role c
∗
i (r)
and identity i of Admin User.
Output: The server encrypted permission assignment list LS and the server generated role
c(r).
1: Ksi ← KS [i] {retrieve the server side key corresponding to Admin User i}
2: c(r)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (r), Ksi )
3: LS ← φ
4: for each client encrypted permission (c∗i (action), c
∗
i (target)) in list LCi do
5: c(action)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (action), Ksi )
6: c(target)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (target), Ksi )
7: LS ← LS ∪ (c(action), c(target))
8: end for
9: return (c(r), LS )
Deployment of Permission Assignment Policies: An Admin
User can assign permissions to a role. In order to deploy poli-
cies regarding permissions assignment to roles, an Admin User
runs Algorithm 7. This algorithm takes as input a list of permis-
sions L to be assigned to role r, the client side key set Kui cor-
responding to Admin User i and the public parameters params
and outputs the client encrypted permission assignment list LCi
assigned to client generated role c∗i (r). First, it generates client
encrypted role c∗i (r) by calling ClientEnc illustrated in Algo-
rithm 3 (Line 1). Next, it creates and initialises new list LCi
(Line 2). For each permission in L (Line 3), it generates the
client encrypted action c∗i (action) (Line 4) and the client en-
crypted target c∗i (target) (Line 5) and updates LCi by adding the
client encrypted permission (Line 6). An Admin User sends the
client encrypted permission list along with the client encrypted
role to the Administration Point. The Administration Point runs
another round of encryption by running Algorithm 8. This algo-
rithm takes as input the client encrypted permission assignment
list LCi for client generated role c
∗
i (r) and identity i of Admin
User and outputs the server encrypted permission assignment
list LS and the server generated role c(r). First, it retrieves from
the Key Store the server side key set Ksi corresponding to Ad-
min User i (Line 1). Next, it generates the server encrypted role
by calling ServerReEnc illustrated in Algorithm 4 (Line 2).
Then, it creates and initialises new list LS (Line 3). For each
client encrypted role in LCi (Line 4), it generates the server en-
crypted action (Line 5) and the server encrypted target (Line
6) and updates LS by adding the server encryption permission
10
(Line 7).
Algorithm 9 ContextualConditionDeployment:ClientSide
Input: The contextual condition T , the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin
User i and the public parameters params.
Output: The client encrypted contextual condition TCi .
1: TCi ← T
2: for each leaf node e in TCi do
3: c∗i (e)← call ClientEnc (r, Kui , params)
4: replace e of TCi with c
∗
i (e)
5: end for
6: return TCi
Algorithm 10 ContextualConditionDeployment:ServerSide
Input: The client encrypted contextual condition TCi and identity of Admin User i.
Output: The server encrypted contextual condition TS
1: Ksi ← KS [i] {retrieve the server side key corresponding to Admin User i}
2: TS ← TCi
3: for each client encrypted leaf node c∗i (e) in TS do
4: c(e)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (e), Ksi )
5: replace c∗i (e) of TS with c(e)
6: end for
7: return TS
Deployment of Contextual Conditions: The contextual con-
dition (part of role assignment and permission assignment poli-
cies) can be deployed in two steps. In the first step, an Admin
User performs a first round of encryption by running Algorithm
9. This algorithm takes as input the contextual condition T ,
the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin User i and
the public parameters params and outputs the client encrypted
contextual condition TCi . First, it copies T to TCi (Line 1).
For each leaf node in TCi (Line 2), it generates the client en-
crypted element by calling ClientEnc illustrated in Algorithm
3 (Line 3) and then updates TCi by replacing element e with the
client encrypted element c∗i (e) (Line 4). An Admin User sends
the client encrypted contextual condition to the Administration
Point. In the second step, the Administration Point performs
another round of encryption by running Algorithm 10. This
algorithm takes as input the client encrypted contextual condi-
tion TCi and identity of Admin User i and outputs the server
encrypted contextual condition TS . First, it retrieves from the
Key Store the server side key Ksi corresponding to Admin User
i (Line 1). Next, it copies TCi to TS (Line 2). For each each
client encrypted leaf node in TS (Line 3), it generates the server
encrypted element by calling ServerReEnc illustrated in Algo-
rithm 4 (Line 4). Then, it replaces the client encrypted element
c∗i (e) of TS with the server encrypted element c(e) (Line 5).
Algorithm 11 RoleHierarchyDeployment:ClientSide
Input: The role hierarchy graph G, the client side key set Kui corresponding to Admin
User i and the public parameters params.
Output: The client generated role hierarchy graph GCi .
1: GCi ← G
2: for each node r in GCi do
3: c∗i (r)← call ClientEnc (r, Kui , params)
4: td∗i (r)← call ClientTD (r, Kui , params) {see Algorithm 13}
5: replace r of GCi with (c
∗
i (r), td
∗
i (r))
6: end for
7: return GCi
Algorithm 12 RoleHierarchyDeployment:ServerSide
Input: The client generated role hierarchy graph GCi and identity of Admin User i.
Output: The server generated role hierarchy graph GS
1: Ksi ← KS [i] {retrieve the server side key corresponding to Admin User i}
2: GS ← GCi
3: for each client generated node (c∗i (r), td
∗
i (r)) in GS do
4: c(r)← call ServerReEnc (c∗i (r), Ksi )
5: td(r)← call ServerTD (td∗i (r), Ksi ) {see Algorithm 14}
6: replace (c∗i (r), td
∗
i (r)) of GS with (c(r), td(r))
7: end for
8: return GS
Deployment of Role Hierarchy Graph: We know that a de-
rived role inherits all permissions from its base role. In case if
requested permissions are not assigned to the Requester’s role,
the PDP may need to traverse in the role hierarchy graph to
find base roles corresponding to the Requester’s role and then
PDP verifies if any base role can fulfil requested permissions.
For this purpose, the PDP needs a trapdoor of each base role so
that it can match this trapdoor against roles in the Permission
Repository. Therefore, a role hierarchy graph stores a role trap-
door along with each encrypted role. The deployment of role
hierarchy graph takes place in two steps. In the first step, an
Admin User runs Algorithm 11. This algorithm takes as input
the role hierarchy graph G, the client side key set Kui corre-
sponding to Admin User i and the public parameters params
and outputs the client generated role hierarchy graph GCi . First,
it copies G to GCi (Line 1). For each node r in GCi (Line 2), it
generates the client encrypted role by calling ClientEnc illus-
trated in Algorithm 3 (Line 3) and the client trapdoor by calling
ClientTD (Line 4) illustrated in Algorithm 13 that is explained
later in this section. Next, it replaces r of GCi with the client
encrypted role and the client generated trapdoor (Line 5). An
Admin User sends the client generated role hierarchy graph to
the Administration Point. In the second step, the Administra-
tion Point runs Algorithm 12. This algorithm takes as input
the client generated role hierarchy graph GCi and identity of
Admin User i and outputs the server generated role hierarchy
graph GS . First, it retrieves from the Key Store the server side
key Ksi corresponding to Admin User i (Line 1). Next, it copies
GCi to GS (Line 2). For each client generated node (Line 3),
it generates the server encrypted role by calling ServerReEnc
illustrated in Algorithm 4 (Line 4) and the server trapdoor by
calling ServerTD (Line 5) illustrated in Algorithm 14 that is
explained later in this section and then updates GS by replacing
the client generated node with the server generated node (Line
6).
Algorithm 13 ClientTD
Input: Element e, the client side key set Kui corresponding to user i and the public param-
eters params.
Output: The client generated trapdoor td∗i (e).
1: Choose a random re ∈ Z∗q
2: σe ← fs(e)
3: t1 ← g−re gσe
4: t2 ← hre g−xi1re gxi1σe = gxi2re gxi1σe
5: td∗i (e)← (t1, t2)
6: return td∗i (e)
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Algorithm 14 ServerTD
Input: The client generated trapdoor td∗i (e) and the server side key set Ksi corresponding
to user i.
Output: The server generated trapdoor td(e).
1: td(e)← txi21 .t2 = gxσe
2: return td(e)
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Figure 9: Policy evaluation phase
6.3. Policy Evaluation Phase
The policy evaluation phase is executed when a Requester
makes a request either ACT or REQ. In this phase, a Requester
sends client generated trapdoors (using Algorithm 13) of a re-
quest to the PEP. The PEP converts client generated trapdoors
into server generated trapdoors (using Algorithm 14) and sends
them to the PDP. The PDP matches server encrypted trapdoors
of the request with server encrypted elements of the policy (us-
ing Algorithm 15). Optionally, the PDP may require contex-
tual information in order to evaluate contextual conditions. The
PIP sends client generated trapdoors of contextual information
to the PDP. The PDP converts client generated trapdoors into
server generated trapdoors and then evaluates contextual condi-
tions based on contextual information. Finally, the PDP returns
either true or false as shown in Figure 9. In the following, we
describe how we generate trapdoors and perform the match.
For calculating client generated trapdoors of a request
(or contextual information), a Requester (or the PIP) runs
ClientTD illustrated in Algorithm 13. ClientTD takes as in-
put each element e of the request, the client side key set Kui
corresponding to user i and the public parameters params and
outputs the client generated trapdoor td∗i (e). First, it choose
randomly re ∈ Z∗q (Line 1). Next, it calculates σe as fs(e)
(Line 2). Then it calculates t1 and t2 as g−re gσe (Line 3) and
hre g−xi1re gxi1σe = gxi2re gxi1σe (Line 4), respectively. Both t1 and
t2 form td∗i (e) (Line 5). A Requester sends client generated trap-
doors of the request to the PEP. The PEP receives client gener-
ated trapdoors and runs ServerTD illustrated in Algorithm 14
for calculating server generated trapdoors. ServerTD takes as
input the client generated trapdoor td∗i (e) and the server side key
Algorithm 15 Match
Input: The server encrypted element c(e) = (c1, c2) and the server generated trapdoor
td(e) = T .
Output: true or false
1: if c2
?
= H(c1.T−1) then
2: return true
3: else
4: return false
5: end if
set Ksi corresponding to user i and outputs the server generated
trapdoor td(e). It calculates td(e) as txi21 .t2 = g
xσe (Line 1).
In order to match a server encrypted element of a policy with
a server generated trapdoor of a request, the PDP runs Match
illustrated in Algorithm 15. Match takes as input the server
encrypted element c(e) = (c1, c2) and the server generated trap-
door td(e) = T and returns either true or false. It checks the
condition c2
?
= H(c1.T−1) (Line 1). If the condition holds, it re-
turns true (Line 2) indicating that the match is successful. Oth-
erwise, it returns false (Line 4).
In the following, we describe how to evaluate (parts of) poli-
cies including role assignment, permission assignment, contex-
tual conditions and role hierarchy graph. For the evaluation of
each (part of) policy, we follow general strategy as already de-
scribed in this section and also illustrated in Figure 9.
Algorithm 16 SearchRole
Input: The client generated trapdoor of role td∗i (r) and the server encrypted role assign-
ment list (or list of active roles in session) LS for Requester i
Output: true or false
1: Ksi ← KS [i] {retrieve the server side key corresponding to Requester i}
2: td(r)← call ServerTD (td∗i (r), Ksi )
3: for each server encrypted role c(r) in LS do
4: match← call Match (c(r), td(r)) {see Algorithm 15}
5: if match ?= true then
6: return true
7: end if
8: end for
9: return false
Searching a Role: A Requester can make a role activation
request ACT and sends it to the SP. In order to grant ACT , the
SP runs SearchRole illustrated in Algorithm 16. This algorithm
takes as input the client generated trapdoor of role td∗i (r) and the
server encrypted role assignment list LS for Requester i. First, it
retrieves from the Key Store the server side key Ksi correspond-
ing to Requester i (Line 1). Next, it calculates the server gener-
ated trapdoor td(r) by calling Algorithm 14 (Line 2). For each
server encrypted role c(r) in LS (Line 3), it performs matching
against td(r) by calling Algorithm 15 (Line 4). If any match is
successful (Line 5), it returns true (Line 6), meaning that ACT
is granted. Otherwise, it returns false (Line 9).
After ACT is granted, the PEP updates Session by adding
in the Active Roles repository the server generated trapdoor of
role. Once a Requester is active in a role, she can make an
access request REQ. Before granting REQ, the SP checks if the
Requester is already in the role in REQ. For this purpose, the
SP runs Algorithm 16, where LS shows a list of active roles in
the session. Furthermore, the PDP also runs Algorithm 16 for
searching the role in REQ in the Permission Repository with a
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slight modification of ignoring the server trapdoor generation
(in Line 2) as it is already generated when the role of REQ is
searched in the session.
Algorithm 17 SearchPermission
Input: The client generated trapdoor of permission (td∗i (action), td
∗
i (target) and the server
encrypted permission assignment list LS for Requester i
Output: true or false
1: Ksi ← KS [i] {retrieve the server side key corresponding to Requester i}
2: td(action)← call ServerTD (td∗i (action), Ksi )
3: td(target)← call ServerTD (td∗i (target), Ksi )
4: for each server encrypted permission (c(action), c(target)) in LS do
5: matchaction ← call Match (c(action), td(action))
6: matchtarget ← call Match (c(target), td(target))
7: if matchaction
?
= true and matchtarget
?
= true then
8: return true
9: end if
10: end for
11: return false
Searching a Permission: A Requester can send REQ for ex-
ecuting certain permissions. The PEP on the SP checks if the
Requester is active in the role indicated in REQ and then the
searches that role in the Permission Repository by running Al-
gorithm 16. After a role is matched in the Permission Repos-
itory, the PEP searches the permission in REQ by running Al-
gorithm 17. This algorithm takes as input the client generated
trapdoor of permission (td∗i (action), td
∗
i (target) and the server
encrypted permission assignment list LS for Requester i and re-
turns either true or false. First, it retrieves from the Key Store
from the Key Store the server side key Ksi corresponding to Re-
quester i (Line 1). Next, it calculates server generated trapdoors
of both action (Line 2) and target (Line 3) by calling Algorithm
14. For each server encrypted permission (c(action), c(target))
in LS (Line 4), it matches the server encrypted action with the
server generated action (Line 5) and the server encrypted target
with the server generated taret (Line 6), respectively, by calling
Algorithm 15. If both matches are successful (Line 7) for any
permission (c(action), c(target)) in LS , it returns true (Line 8).
Otherwise, it returns false (Line 11).
Algorithm 18 ContextualConditionRequest
Input: List of attributes contextual attributes L, the client side key set Kui corresponding
to Requester i and the public parameters params.
Output: The client generated list of trapdoors of contextual attributes LCi .
1: LCi ← φ
2: for each attribute e in L do
3: td∗i (e)← call ClientTD (r, Kui , params)
4: LCi ← LCi ∪ td∗i (e)
5: end for
6: return TCi
Generating Contextual Attributes: The PIP runs Contex-
tualAttributesRequest illustrated in Algorithm 18 to calculate
client generated trapdoors of contextual information. Contex-
tualAttributesRequest takes as input a list of contextual at-
tributes L, the client side key set Kui corresponding to Requester
i and the public parameters params and outputs the client gen-
erated list of trapdoors of contextual attributes LCi . First, it cre-
ates and initialises new list LCi (Line 1). For each attribute e in
L (Line 2), it calculates the client generated trapdoor td∗i (e) by
calling Algorithm 13 (Line 3) and adds td∗i (e) in LCi (Line 4).
Algorithm 19 EvaluateTree
Input: Node n and tree T .
Output: true or false.
1: if n.decision , null then
2: return n.decision
3: end if
4: for each child c of n in tree T do
5: call EvaluateTree (c, T ) {recursive call}
6: end for
7: t ← 0
8: m← 0
9: for each child c of n in tree T do
10: t ← t + 1
11: if c.decision ?= true then
12: m← m + 1
13: end if
14: end for
15: if (n.gate ?= AND and m ?= t) or (n.gate ?= OR and m ≥ 1) then
16: n.decision← true
17: else
18: n.decision← f alse
19: end if
20: return n.decision
Evaluating Contextual Conditions: For evaluating any con-
textual condition, the PDP runs ContextualConditionEvalu-
ation illustrated in Algorithm 20. This algorithm takes as in-
put the client generated list of trapdoors of contextual attributes
LCi , the server encrypted contextual condition TS and identity
of Requester i and returns either true or false. First, it retrieves
from the Key Store the server side key Ksi corresponding to Re-
quester i (Line 1). Next, it creates and initialises a new list LS
(Line 2). For each client generated trapdoor td∗i (e) in LCi (Line
3), it calculates the server generated trapdoor td(e) by calling
Algorithm 14 (Line 4) and adds td(e) in LS (Line 5). Next,
it copies TS to TREE (Line 7) and adds decision field to each
node in TREE (Line 8). For each node n in TREE (Line 9), it
initialises n.decision as null (Line 10). For each leaf node n
in TREE (Line 12), it checks if any server generated trapdoor
td(e) in LS (Line 13) matches with it by calling Algorithm 15
(Line 14). Next, it evaluates non-leaf nodes of TREE by run-
ning Algorithm 19 (Line 20). Finally, it returns either true or
false depending upon the evaluation of TREE (Line 21).
Algorithm 20 ContextualConditionEvaluation
Input: The client generated list of trapdoors of contextual attributes LCi , the server en-
crypted contextual condition TS and identity of Requester i.
Output: true or false
1: Ksi ← KS [i] {retrieve the server side key corresponding to Requester i}
2: LS ← φ
3: for each client generated trapdoor td∗i (e) in LCi do
4: td(e)← call ServerTD (td∗i (e), Ksi )
5: LS ← LS ∪ td∗i (e)
6: end for
7: TREE ← TS
8: Add decision field to each node in TREE
9: for each node n in TREE do
10: n.decision← null
11: end for
12: for each leaf node n in TREE do
13: for each server generated trapdoor td(e) in LS do
14: n.decision← call Match (n.c(e), td(e))
15: if n.decision ?= true then
16: return break;
17: end if
18: end for
19: end for
20: call EvaluateTree (TREE.root, TREE) {see Algorithm 19}
21: return TREE.root.decision
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EvaluateTree evaluates a tree containing AND and OR
gates. It takes as input root node n and tree T and returns ei-
ther true or false. First, it checks if the decision for n is already
made (Line 1). If so, it returns the decision (Line 2). For each
child c of n in tree T (Line 4), it recursively calls EvaluateTree
(Line 5). Next, it creates and initialises t (Line 7) and m (Line
8) indicating total children of n and a count of matched chil-
dren, respectively. For each child c of n in tree T (Line 9), it
counts total children (Line 10) and matched children by check-
ing made decisions (Line 12). Next, it checks if non-leaf node
is AND and all children are matched or non-leaf node is OR
and at least one child is matched (Line 15). If so, it is set as
true (Line 16) and false (Line 18) otherwise.
Algorithm 21 SearchRoleHierarchyGraph
Input: The server generated trapdoor of role td(r) and the server generated role hierarchy
graph GS
Output: true or false
1: for each server encrypted role c(r) in GS do
2: match← call Match (c(r), td(r))
3: if match ?= true then
4: return true
5: end if
6: end for
7: return false
Searching Roles in Role Hierarchy Graph: The PDP may
need to search base roles of one in REQ since a derived role
inherits all permissions from its base role. The PDP runs
SearchRoleHierarchyGraph illustrated in Algorithm 21 to
find base roles from the encrypted role hierarchy graph. This
algorithm takes as input the server generated trapdoor of role
td(r) and the server generated role hierarchy graph GS and re-
turns true if any base role is found and false otherwise. For
each server encrypted role c(r) in GS (Line 1), it checks if td(r)
matches with any c(r) by calling Algorithm 15 (Line 2). If any
match is found (Line 3), it returns true (Line 4). Otherwise, it
returns false (Line 7).
Algorithm 22 UserRevocation
Input: The user identity i.
Output: true or false.
1: if exits(KS [i]) ?= f alse then
2: return false
3: end if
4: Ksi ← KS [i]
5: KS ← KS \Ksi
6: return true
6.4. Revocation Phase
In this phase, the PEP can remove a compromised user from
the system. In order to remove a user, the PEP runs UserRevo-
cation illustrated in Algorithm 22. This algorithm takes as in-
put the user identity i and returns either true (indicating that the
user has been removed successfully) or false (indicating that the
user does not exist in the system). First, it checks if the given
user exists by checking the Key Store. If no, it returns false
(Line 2). Otherwise, it retrieves from the Key Store the server
side key set Ksi corresponding to user i (Line 4), removes Ksi
from the Key Store (Line 5) and returns true (Line 6).
7. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyse the security of the policy deploy-
ment phase that includes Role Assignment (RA) encryption
(Algorithms 5 and 6), Permission Assignment (PA) encryption
(Algorithms 7 and 8), Contextual Condition (CC) encryption
(Algorithms 9 and 10), and Role Hierarchy (RH) encryption
(Algorithms 11 and 12). We then analyse the security of the
policy evaluation phase that include Search Role (SR) (Algo-
rithms 13 and 16), Search Permission (Algorithms 13 and 17),
Contextual Condition Evaluation (Algorithms 18 and 20) and
Search Role Hierarchy (Algorithms 13, 14 and 21).
We first define some basic concepts on which we build our
security proofs.
7.1. Preliminaries
In general, a scheme is considered secure if no adversary
can break the scheme with probability significantly greater than
random guessing. The adversary’s advantage in breaking the
scheme should be a negligible function of the security parame-
ter.
Definition 1 (Negligible Function). A function f is negligible if
for each polynomial p() there exists N such that for all integers
n > N it holds that f (n) < 1p(n) .
We consider a realistic adversary that is computationally
bounded and show that our scheme is secure against such an
adversary. We model the adversary as a randomised algorithm
that runs in polynomial time and show that the success proba-
bility of any such adversary is negligible. An algorithm that is
randomised and runs in polynomial time is called a Probabilis-
tic Polynomial Time (PPT) algorithm.
Our scheme relies on the existence of a pseudorandom func-
tion f . Intuitively, the output a pseudorandom function cannot
be distinguished by a realistic adversary from that of a truly ran-
dom function. Formally, a pseudorandom function is defined
as:
Definition 2 (Pseudorandom Function). A function f : {0, 1}∗×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is pseudorandom if for all PPT adversariesA,
there exists a negligible function negl such that:
|Pr[A fk(·) = 1] − Pr[AF(·) = 1]| < negl(n)
where k → {0, 1}n is chosen uniformly randomly and F is a
function chosen uniformly randomly from the set of function
mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings.
Our proof relies on the assumption that the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) is hard in a group G, i.e., it is hard for an ad-
versary to distinguish between group elements gαβ and gγ given
gα and gβ.
Definition 3 (DDH Assumption). The DDH problem is hard
regarding a group G if for all PPT adversaries A, there exists
a negligible function negl such that |Pr[A(G, q, g, gα, gβ, gαβ) =
1]−Pr[A(G, q, g, gα, gβ, gγ) = 1]| < negl(k) whereG is a cyclic
group of order q (|q| = k) and g is a generator ofG, and α, β, γ ∈
Zq are uniformly randomly chosen.
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Encryption algorithms in policy deployment phase are based
on ClientEnc and ServerReEnc functions that is equivalent to
encrypting a single keyword in the SDE scheme [14]. Dong
et al. [14] show that the single keyword encryption scheme is
indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA). A
cryptosystem is considered IND-CPA secure if no PPT adver-
sary, given an encryption of a message randomly chosen from
two plaintext messages chosen by the adversary, can identify
the message choice with non-negligible probability. Dong et
al. [14] prove the following theorem about the single Keyword
Encryption (KE) scheme:
Theorem 1. If the DDH problem is hard relative to G, then
the single keyword encryption scheme KE is IND-CPA secure
against the server S, i.e., for all PPT adversariesA there exists
a negligible function negl such that:
S uccAKE,S (k) = Pr

b′ = b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(param,msk)← Init(1k)
(Ku,Ks)← KeyGen(msk,U)
w0,w1 ← AClientEnc(Ku,·)(Ks)
b
R←− {0, 1}
c∗i (wb) = ClientEnc(xi1,wb)
b′ ← AClientEnc(Ku,·)(Ks, c∗i (wb))

< 12 + negl(k)
(1)
Proof. See Theorem 1 in [14].
7.2. Security of Encryption Algorithms in the Policy Deploy-
ment Phase
Using the fact that the KE scheme is IND-CPA secure, we
show that the four encryption schemes: RA, PA, CC and RH
are also IND-CPA against the server. We give the proof details
for the Roles Assignment encryption scheme RA. We will show
that the following theorem holds:
Theorem 2. If the single keyword encryption KE scheme is
IND-CPA secure against the server, then the RA encryption
scheme RA is also IND-CPA, i.e., for all PPT adversaries A,
there exists a negligible function negl such that S uccARA,S (k) <
1
2 + negl(k).
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing that breaking the
RA encryption reduces to breaking the KE encryption. We
define the following game in which the adversary A chal-
lenges the game with two lists of roles L0 and L1 having the
same number of roles t. We construct the following vec-
tor containing the encryption of roles from both lists: ~C(i) =
C(r10), . . . ,C(r
i
0),C(r
i+1
1 ), . . . ,C(r
t
1). The success probability of
the adversary in distinguishing the encryption of the two lists of
roles is defined as:
S uccA(k) =
1
2
Pr[A( ~C0) = 0] +
1
2
Pr[A( ~Ct) = 1] (2)
In the following, we show that breaking the RA scheme re-
duces to breaking the KE game. In the KE game from [14], the
adversary challenges the game with two keywords w0 and w1
and tries to distinguish between their encryptions. Let us con-
sider a PPT adversary A′ who attempts to challenge the single
keyword encryption scheme KE using the corresponding RA
adversaryA as a sub-routine The game is the following:
• A′ is given the parameters (G, q, g, h,H, f ) as input and
for each user i is given (i, xi2).
• A′ passes these parameters toA.
• A generates two lists of roles L0 and L1 having the same
number of roles t and gives them toA′.
• A′ chooses i r←− [1, t]. It then uses ri0, ri1 to challenge the
single keyword encryption KE game. The adversary gets
back cib as the result, where c
i
b is the encryption of either
ri0 or r
i
1. A′ uses this result to construct a hybrid vector
(c10, . . . , c
i−1
0 , c
i
b, c
i+1
1 , . . . , c
t
1) and sends it toA.
• A′ outputs b′, the bit output byA.
A is required to distinguish ~C(i) and ~C(i−1) and the probability
ofA’s success in distinguishing correctly is:
S ucciA(k) =
1
2
Pr[A( ~C(i)) = 0] +
1
2
Pr[A( ~C(i−1)) = 1] (3)
Because i is randomly chosen, it holds that:
S uccA′ (k) =
∑t
i=1 S ucc
i
A(t) · 1t
= 12t Pr[A( ~C
0) = 0] +
∑t−1
i=1(Pr[A( ~C
i) = 0]
+Pr[A( ~Ci) = 1]) + 12 Pr[A( ~C
t) = 1]
= 1t (
1
2 Pr[A( ~C
0) = 0] + 12 Pr[A( ~C
t) = 1]) + t−12t
= 1t S uccA(k) +
t−1
2t
(4)
Because the success probability ofA′ to break the single key-
word encryption scheme is S uccA′ (k) < 12 + negl(k), it follows
that S uccA(k) < 12 + negl(k).
The proof for the other encryption schemes is similar and for
lack of space we do not show all the details.
7.3. Security of Algorithms in the Policy Evaluation Phase
We now analyse the security of SR, Search Permission, Con-
textual Condition Evaluation and Search Role Hierarchy. These
algorithms require the SP to take some client input (i.e., trap-
doors computed using Algorithm 13), process it (i.e., re-encrypt
it using Algorithm 14), and test whether it matches some infor-
mation stored on the server. Though a single operation has been
proved secure, we are interested in what these algorithms leak
to the SP. We follow the concept of non-adaptive indistinguisha-
bility security introduced for encrypted databases by [10] and
adapted by [14] in a multi-user setting. We show that given two
non-adaptively generated histories with the same length and
outcome, no PPT adversary can distinguish the histories based
on what it can observe from the interaction. A history contains
all the interactions between clients and the SP. Non-adaptive
history means that the adversary cannot choose sequences of
client inputs based on previous inputs and matching outcomes.
In the following, we show the details for the SR scheme. In
this scheme, a history is defined as follows:
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Definition 4 (SR History). An SR history Hi is an interaction
between a SP and all clients that connect to it, over i role ac-
tivation requests. Hi = (Lu1s , . . . , Luis , ru11 , . . . , ruii ), where ui rep-
resents an identifier of the client making the requests, Luis repre-
sents the lists of roles for client ui, and r
ui
i represents the request
made by the client.
We formalise the information leaked to a SP as a trace. We
define two kinds of traces: the trace of a single request and
the trace of a history. The trace of a request leaks to the SP
which role in Lis matches the request and can be formally de-
fined as: tr(r) = {td ∗i (role), Lis, idx}, where idx is the index of
the matched role, if any, in Lis.
We define the role matching pattern P over a history Hi to
be a set of binary matrices (one for each client) with columns
corresponding to encrypted roles in the list of the client, and
rows corresponding to requests. P[ j, k] = 1 if request j matched
the k’s role and P[ j, k] = 0 otherwise.
The trace of a history includes the encrypted role assignment
lists of all clients Luis stored by the SP and which can change
as new roles are added and clients leave of join the system, the
trace of each request, and the role matching pattern Pi for each
client.
During an interaction, the adversary cannot see directly the
plaintext of the request, instead it sees the ciphertext. The view
of a request is defined as:
Definition 5 (View of a Request). We define the view of a re-
quest qu11 under a key set Kui as: VKui (q
ui ) = tr(qui )
Definition 6 (View of a History). We define the view
of a history with i interactions Hi as VKu (Hi) =
(Lu1s , . . . , L
ui
s ,VKui (q
ui
1 ), . . . ,VKui (q
ui
i ).
The security definition is based on the idea that the scheme
is secure if nothing is leaked to the adversary beyond what the
adversary can learn from traces.
We define the following game in which an adversaryA gen-
erates two histories Hi0 and Hi1 with the same trace over i
requests. Then the adversary is challenged to distinguish the
views of the two histories. If the adversary succeeds with neg-
ligible probability, the scheme is secure.
Definition 7 (Non-adaptive indistinguishability against a curi-
ous SP). The SR scheme is secure in the sense of non-adaptive
indistinguishability against a curious SP if for all i ∈ N and for
all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function negl
such that:
Pr

b′ = b
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(params,msk)← Init(1k)
(Ku,Ks)← KeyGen(msk,U)
Hio,Hi1 ← A(Ks)
b
R←− {0, 1}
b′ ← A(Ks,VKu (Hib))

<
1
2
+ negl(k)
(5)
where U is a set of user IDs, Ku is the user side key sets, Ks
are the server side key sets, Hi1 andHi0 are two histories over
i requests such that Tr(Hi0) = Tr(Hi1).
Theorem 3. If the DDH problem in hard relative toG, then the
SR scheme is a non-adaptive indistinguishable secure scheme.
The success probability of a PPT adversary A in breaking the
SR scheme is defined as:
S uccA(k) = 12 Pr[A(RA(~L0),T D(~r0)) = 0]+
1
2 Pr[A(RA(~L1),T D(~r1)) = 1]
< 12 + negl(k)
(6)
where RA(~Li) is the role encryption of the vector of lists of Hi,
and T D(~ri) is the ClientTD of the roles in the requests of Hi.
Proof. We consider an adversary A′ that challenges the RE
IND-CPA game using A as a sub-routine. A′ does the follow-
ing:
• A′ receives public parameters params and the server side
(i, xi2) keys.
• To generate a view of a history Hi =
(Lu11 , . . . , L
ui
i , q
u1
1 , . . . , q
ui
i ). A′ performs the following
steps:
– For each role assignment list Lu jj , run Algorithm 5 to
encrypt it as RA(Lu jj ).
– For each Search Role request qu jj , run ClientT D to
generate the trapdoor T D(r) for the role.
• A outputs Hi0,Hi1. A′ encrypts Hi1 by itself and chal-
lenges the RE IND-CPA game with ~L0 and ~L1, the vec-
tors of all roles lists in the two histories. It gets the result
RA(~Lb) where b
R←− {0, 1} and forms a view of a history
(RA(~Lb),T D(~r1)). It sends the view toA.
• A tries to determine which vector was encrypted and out-
puts b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
• A′ outputs b′.
Because the RA scheme is IND-CPA, it follows that:
1
2 + negl(k) > S ucc
A′
RA(k)
= 12 Pr[A((RA(~L0),T D(~r1))) = 0]+
1
2 Pr[A((RA(~L1),T D(~r1))) = 1]
(7)
Now let us consider another adversaryA′′ who wants to dis-
tinguish the pseudorandom function f usingA as a sub-routine.
The adversary does the following:
• It generates (G, q, g, h,H) as public parameters, and sends
them to A along with f . For each user i, it chooses ran-
domly xi1, xi2 such that xi1 + xi2 = x. It sends all (i, xi2) to
A and keeps all (i, xi1, xi2).
• A outputs Hi0,Hi1. A′′ encrypts all the roles lists in Hi0
as RA(~L0). It chooses b
R←− {0, 1} and asks the oracle to
encrypt all roles in Hib. It combines the results to form a
view (RA(~L0),T D(~rb)) and returns it toA.
16
• A outputs b′. A′′ outputs 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise.
There are two cases to consider: Case 1: the oracle in A′′s
game is the pseudorandom function f , then:
Pr[A′′ fs(.)(1k) = 1] =
1
2 Pr[A(RA(~L0),T D(~r0)) = 0]+
1
2 Pr[A(RA(~L0),T D(~r1)) = 1]
(8)
Case 2: the oracle inA′′s game is a random function F, then
for each distinct role r, σr is completely random to A. More-
over, we know the traces are identical, so RA(~Lb) and T D(~rb)
are completely random toA. In this case:
Pr[A′′ fs(.)(1k) = 1] = 1
2
(9)
Because f is a pseudorandom function, by definition it holds
that:
|Pr[A′′ fs(.)(1k) = 1] − Pr[A′ fs(.)(1k) = 1]| < negl(k)
Pr[A′′ fs(.)(1k) = 1] < 12 + negl(k)
(10)
Sum up S uccA′RE(k) and Pr[A′′ fs(.)(1k) = 1]:
1 + negl(k) > 12 Pr[A(RA(~L0),T D(~r0)) = 0]+
1
2 Pr[A(RA(~L0),T D(~r1)) = 1]+
1
2 Pr[A(RA(~L0),T D(~r1)) = 0]+
1
2 Pr[A(RA(~L1),T D(~r1)) = 1]
= 12 Pr[A(RA(~L0),T D(~r0)) = 0]+
1
2 +
1
2 Pr[A(RA(~L1),T D(~r1)) = 1]+
= 12 + S ucc
A(k)
(11)
Therefore S uccA(k) < 12 + negl(k).
7.4. Revealing Policy Structure
The policy structure reveals information about the operators,
such as AND and OR, and the number of operands used in
the contextual condition. To overcome this problem, dummy
attributes could be inserted in the tree representing contextual
conditions. Similarly, the PIP can send dummy attributes to the
PDP at the time of policy evaluation to obfuscate the number of
attributes required for evaluating any contextual condition.
8. Performance Analysis
In this section, we discuss a quantitative analysis of the per-
formance of ESPOONERBAC. It should be noticed that here we
are concerned about quantifying the overhead introduced by the
encryption operations performed both at the trusted environ-
ment and the outsourced environment. In the following dis-
cussion, we do not take into account the latency introduced by
the network communication.
8.1. Implementation Details
We have implemented ESPOONERBAC in Java 1.6. We
have developed all the components of the architecture required
for performing the policy deployment and policy evaluation
phases. For the cryptographic operations, we have implemented
all the functions presented in Section 6. We have tested the im-
plementation of ESPOONERBAC on a single node based on an
Intel Core2 Duo 2.2 GHz processor with 2 GB of RAM, run-
ning Microsoft Windows XP Professional version 2002 Service
Pack 3.
8.2. Performance Analysis of the Policy Deployment Phase
In this section, we analyse the performance of the policy de-
ployment phase. In this phase, an Admin User encrypts poli-
cies and sends those encrypted policies to the Administration
Point running in the outsourced environment. The Adminis-
tration Point re-encrypts policies and stores them in the Policy
Store in the outsourced environment. In the following, we anal-
yse the performance of deploying (part of) policies including
role assignment, permission assignment, contextual conditions
and role hierarchy graph.
Role Assignment: In order to deploy a role assignment pol-
icy, an Admin User performs a first round of encryption on the
client side (see Algorithm 5) and sends the client encrypted role
assignment policy to the Administration Point. The Adminis-
tration Point performs another round of encryption on the server
side (see Algorithm 6) before storing role assignment policy in
the Policy Store. Figure 10(a) shows performance overhead on
the client side, as well as on the server side in order to deploy
a role assignment policy. In this graph, we observe the per-
formance by increasing number of roles in a role assignment
policy. As we can expect, the performance overhead increases
linearly with the linear increase in the number of roles in a role
assignment policy. As we can notice, the graph grows linearly
with the linear increase in the number of roles in the role as-
signment policy.
During the policy deployment phase, the encryption algo-
rithm on the client side (Algorithm 3) takes more time that of
the server side (Algorithm 4) as shown in Figure 10. The en-
cryption algorithm on the client side takes more time because it
performs more complex cryptographic operations such as ran-
dom number generation and hash calculation as illustrated in
Algorithm 3. However, any policy is deployed very rarely;
whereas, it may be evaluated quite frequently. Therefore, the
performance overhead of the policy evaluation phase (discussed
in Section 8.3) is of great importance.
Permission Assignment: For deploying permissions to a
role, an Admin User performs a first round of encryption on
the client side (see Algorithm 7) and sends both the client en-
crypted role and client encrypted permissions to the Adminis-
tration Point, where each permission contains both an action
and a target. The Administration Point generates the server en-
crypted role and server encrypted permissions after performing
a second round of encryption on the server side (see Algorithm
8). Figure 10(b) shows the performance overhead of deploy-
ing a permission assignment policy. This graph illustrates the
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Figure 10: Performance overhead of deploying RBAC policies: (a) roles assigned to a user, (b) permissions to a role and (c) a role hierarchy graph
performance of deploying a permission assignment policy for a
role with a number of permissions ranging from 1 to 20. As we
can expect, the performance overhead increases linearly with
the linear increase in the number of permissions in the permis-
sion assignment policy.
Contextual Conditions: Both role assignment and permis-
sion assignment policies include a contextual condition as we
can see in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively. The contextual
condition is represented as a tree structure as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4. During the policy deployment phase, an Admin User
encrypts each leaf node of the tree (see Algorithm 9) while the
Administration Point re-encrypts each leaf node (see Algorithm
10) and finally stores the tree in the Policy Store either in the
Role Repository or the Permission Repository.
In the tree representing contextual conditions, leaf
nodes represent string comparisons (for instance,
Location = Cardiology-ward) and/or numerical compar-
isons (for instance, AccessTime
> 9). A string comparison is always represented by a single
leaf node while a numerical comparison may require more
than one leaf nodes. In the worst case, a single numerical
comparison, represented as s bits, may require s separate leaf
nodes. Therefore, numerical comparisons have a major impact
on the encryption of a policy at deployment time.
Figure 11(a) illustrates the performance overhead of deploy-
ing numerical and string comparisons. In this graph, we in-
crease the number of string comparisons and numerical com-
parisons present in the contextual condition of a policy. As
the graph, the time taken by deployment functions on the
client side and the server side grow linearly with the num-
ber of comparisons in the contextual condition. The numer-
ical comparisons have a stepper line because one numerical
comparison of size s may be equivalent to s string compar-
isons in the worst case. For string comparisons, we have used
“attributeNamei=attributeValuei”, where i varies from 1 to 10.
For numerical comparisons, we have used “attributeNamei <
15#4”.2
To check how the size of the bit representation impacts on
the encryption functions during the deployment phase, we have
2It should be noted that using the comparison less than 15 in a 4-bit repre-
sentation represents the worst case scenario requiring 4 leaf nodes.
performed the following experiment. We fixed the number of
numerical comparisons in the contextaul condition to only one
and increased the size s of the bit representation from 2 to 20 for
the comparison “attributeName < 2s − 1. Figure 11(b) shows
the performance overhead of the encryption during the policy
deployment phase on the client side, as well as on the server
side. We can see that the policy deployment time incurred
grows linearly with the increase in the size s of a numerical
attribute. In general, the time complexity of the encryption of
the contextual conditions during the policy deployment phase
is O(m + ns) where m is the number of string comparisons, n
is the number of numerical comparisons, and s represents the
number of bits in each numerical comparison.
Role Hierarchy Graph: The PDP may search for a base role
of the one in the access request REQ since a derived role in-
herits all permissions from its base role. For supporting this
search, we deploy a role hierarchy graph. For deploying a role
hierarchy graph, an Admin User performs the first round in or-
der to generate the client encrypted trapdoor, as well as to cal-
culate the client generated trapdoor of each role in the graph
(see Algorithm 11). The Admin User sends the client generated
role hierarchy graph to the Administration Point. The Admin-
istration Point performs the second round to generate the server
encrypted trapdoor, as well as to calculate the server generated
trapdoor of each role in the graph (see Algorithm 12). The PDP
matches the trapdoor of role in REQ with the server encrypted
role and if this match is successful, it finds trapdoors of the
base roles. The trapdoors of base roles are required in order to
perform search in the list of server encrypted roles in the Per-
mission Repository.
In our experiment, we consider a role hierarchy graph in
which each role Ri extends role Ri+1 for all values of i from 0
to n − 1 where n indicates the total number of nodes and varies
from 5 to 25. Figure 10(c) shows the performance overhead of
encrypting a role hierarchy graph both on the client side and the
server side. The graph grows linearly with the number of roles
in a role hierarchy graph.
8.3. Performance Analysis of the Policy Evaluation Phase
In this section, we analyse the performance of the policy
evaluation phase. In this phase, a Requester sends the encrypted
request to the PEP running in the outsourced environment. The
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Figure 11: Performance overhead of deploying contextual conditions: (a) numerical and string comparisons and (b) size of a numerical attribute
Table 1: Performance overhead of encrypting requests during the policy evalu-
ation phase
Request Type Time (in milliseconds)
ACT 16.353
REQ 47.069
PEP forwards the encrypted request to the PDP. The PDP has to
select the set of policies that are applicable to the request. The
PDP may require contextual information in order to evaluate
the selected policies. In the following, we calculate the per-
formance overhead of generating requests, search a role (in the
Role Repository, in the Active Roles repository or in the Per-
mission Repository), searching a permission, evaluating con-
textual conditions and searching a role in a role hierarchy graph.
Generating Requests: A Requester may send the role ac-
tivation request ACT . In order to generate ACT , a Requester
calculates the client generated role (see Algorithm 13). This
trapdoor generation of role takes 16.353 milliseconds as illus-
trated in Table 1. After a Requester is active in a role, she may
make an access request REQ . A Requester has to calculate
trapdoor for each element (including role, action and target) in
REQ. The REQ generation takes 47.069 milliseconds as illus-
trated in Table 1. We can see that REQ generation takes 3 times
of ACT generation because REQ has to calculate 3 trapdoors
while ACT has to generate only a single trapdoor. The request
generation does not depend on any parameters and can be con-
sidered constant.
Searching a Role in Role Repository/Session: In order to
grant ACT , the PDP needs to search roles in the Role Repos-
itory. For searching a role, the PDP first calculates the server
generated trapdoor of role in ACT and then matches this server
encrypted trapdoor with server encrypted roles in the role as-
signment list as illustrated in Algorithm 16. Figure 12(a) shows
the performance overhead (in the worst case) of performing this
search. In this graph, we can observe that it grows linearly with
increase in number of roles. As the graph indicates, the search
function takes initial approximately 4 milliseconds to generate
the server encrypted trapdoor of role in ACT while it takes ap-
proximately 0.6 milliseconds to perform encrypted match.
The PDP grants ACT by adding the server encrypted role of
the Requester in the Active Roles repository of the Session.
This implies that the Session maintains a list of active roles.
Once a Requester makes an access request REQ, the PDP has to
search in the Session if she is already active in role indicated in
REQ. The performance overhead of searching a role in session
is same as it incurs for searching a role in the Role Repository
(shown in Figure 12(a)).
Searching a Role in Permission Repository: After finding
the role of REQ in the list of active roles, the PDP has to search
if the same role has the requested permission. For this purpose,
the PDP has first to search the role of REQ in the Permission
Repository and if any match is found, it has to search the re-
quested permission in the list of permissions assigned to the
found role. Figure 12(b) shows the performance overhead (in
the worst case) of searching a role in the Permission Reposi-
tory. The graph grows linearly with the increase in the number
of roles in the Permission Repository. The PDP runs Algorithm
16 but with a slight modification of ignoring the server trapdoor
generation (in Line 2) as it is already generated when the role of
REQ is searched in the session. This is why, searching a role in
the Permission Repository (as illustrated in Figure 12(b)) takes
less time than searching a role in the Role Repository or Session
(as illustrated in Figure 12(a)).
Searching a Permission: After a role is found in the Permis-
sion Repository, the PDP searches the requested permission in
the list of permissions assigned to the found role (see Algorithm
17). Before searching the list of permissions, the PDP has to
calculate server generated trapdoors of both the action and the
target present in REQ. As we explained earlier, a single trap-
door generation on the server side takes approximately 4 mil-
liseconds. The trapdoor generation of the requested permission,
containing an action and a target, takes 8 milliseconds. Next,
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Figure 12: Performance overhead of evaluating RBAC policies
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the PDP match (server generated trapdoors of) this requested
permission with the list of (sever encrypted) permissions as-
signed to the found role. Figure 12(c) shows the performance
overhead (in the worst case) of searching server generated trap-
door of permission with a list of server encrypted permissions.
The graph grows linearly with the increase in the number of
permissions in the list. For each permission match, the PDP
performs (at most) two encrypted matches each incurring ap-
proximately 0.6 milliseconds.
Evaluating Contextual Conditions: For evaluating role as-
signment (illustrated in Figure 2) or permission assignment
(illustrated in Figure 3) policies, the PDP may need to eval-
uate contextual conditions. For evaluating contextual condi-
tions, the PDP needs to fetch contextual information from the
PIP. The The PIP is responsible to collect and send the re-
quired contextual information that include information about
the Requester (for instance, Requester’s location or Requester’s
age) or the environment in which the request is made (for in-
stance, time or temperature). The PIP transforms these at-
tributes into trapdoors before sending to the PDP (as illustrated
in Algorithm 18). For each single string attribute (for instance,
Location := Cardiology-ward), the PIP generates a single trap-
door. For each numerical attribute of size s-bit (for instance,
AccessTime =: 10#5), the PIP generates s trapdoors. Figure
13(a) shows the performance overhead of generating trapdoors
by the PIP on the client side for both numerical and string at-
tributes. In our experiment, we vary number of attributes (both
string and numeric) from 1 to 10. As we can see, the graph
grows linearly with the increase in number of attributes. For nu-
merical attributes, the curve of trapdoor generation on the client
side is steeper than that of the string attributes because numeri-
cal attribute is of size s bits where s is set to 4. This means that
each numerical attribute requires 4 trapdoors; on the other hand,
a string attribute requires only a single attribute. We observe
also the behaviour of generating client trapdoors for a numeri-
cal attribute of varying size. Figure 13(b) shows behaviour of
generating on the client side trapdoors of a numerical attribute
of varying size ranging from 2 to 20 bits. This graph grows lin-
early with the increase in number of bits, representing size of a
numerical attribute.
After receiving trapdoors of contextual information, the PDP
may evaluate a contextual condition. To evaluate the tree rep-
resenting a contextual condition, the PDP matches contextual
information against the leaf nodes in the tree, as illustrated in
Algorithm 20. To quantify the performance overhead of this en-
crypted matching, we have performed the following test. First,
we have considered two cases: the first case is the one in which
the PIP provides only string attributes and the contextual con-
dition contains only string comparisons; in the second, the PIP
provides only numerical attributes and the contextual condition
consists only of numerical comparisons. For both cases, the
number of attributes varies together with the number of com-
parisons in the tree. In particular, if the PIP provides n different
attributes then the contextual condition will contain n different
comparisons.
Figure 13(a) shows also the performance overhead of evalu-
ating string and numerical comparisons on the server side. As
we can see, the condition evaluation for numerical attributes has
a steeper curve. This can be explained as follows. For the first
case, for each string attribute only a single trapdoor is gener-
ated. A string comparison is represented as a single leaf node
in the tree representing a contextual condition. This means that
n trapdoors in a request are matched against m leaf nodes in the
tree resulting in a O(nm) complexity (however, in our experi-
ments the number of attributes and the number of comparisons
are always the same). For the case of the numerical attributes,
we have also to take in to consideration the bit representation.
In particular, for a give numerical attribute represented as s bits,
we need to generate s different trapdoors. This means that n nu-
merical attributes in a request will be converted in to ns differ-
ent trapdoors. These trapdoors then need to be matched against
the leaf nodes representing the numerical comparisons. Figure
13(b) shows the performance overhead of evaluating a numer-
ical comparison where the size of a numerical attribute varies
from 2 to 20. As we have discussed for the policy deployment
phase, in the worst case scenario, a numerical comparison for a
s-bit numerical attribute requires s different leaf nodes. In a tree
with m different numerical comparisons, this means that the ns
trapdoors need to be matched against ms resulting in O(nms2)
complexity.
Searching a Role Hierarchy Graph: The PDP may search a
role in the role hierarchy graph. For performing this search, we
consider a role hierarchy graph in which each role Ri extends
role Ri+1 for all values of i from 0 to n − 1 where n indicates
the total number of nodes and varies from 5 to 25. Figure 12(d)
shows the performance overhead of searching a role in the role
hierarchy graph deployed on the server side. As we can ex-
pect, the graph grows linearly with the number of roles in a role
hierarchy graph.
Comparing ESPOONERBAC with ESPOON: We com-
pare the performance overheads of the policy evaluation of
ESPOONERBAC with that of ESPOON [1]. Before we show
the comparison, we see how policies are expressed in both
ESPOONERBAC and ESPOON. The ESPOONERBAC policies are
explained in Section 4.2. The ESPOON policy is expressed as
a 〈S , A,T 〉 tuple with a CONDITION, meaning if CONDITION
holds then subject S can take action A over target T . For com-
paring the performance overheads, we consider ESPOON poli-
cies with 50 unique subjects and each subject has 10 unique
actions and targets where each 〈S , A,T 〉 tuple’s condition is
the conjunction (AND) of the contextual condition illustrated
in Figure 4 and RequesterName=<NAME>. That is, a subject
can execute action over the target provided subject’s name is
equal to one specified in the condition, subject’s location is
cardiology-ward and time is between 9 AM and 5 PM. Simi-
larly, we consider ESPOONERBAC policies with 50 unique roles
and each role has 10 unique permissions, where each user can
get active in 5 roles. The introduction of RBAC simplifies
the roles and permission management because we can enforce
possible conditions at role activation time instead of enforcing
them at the permission grant time. For instance, we can en-
force location and time checks (i.e., the condition illustrated
in Figure 4) at the role activation time while the condition
RequesterName=<NAME> can be enforced at the permission
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grant time.
Figure 14 shows the performance overheads of evaluating
ESPOON and ESPOONERBAC policies. In ESPOON, a re-
quester’s subject is matched with one in the repository of 500
entries (i.e., 50 subjects each with 10 actions and targets). If
there is any match, requester’s action and target are matched
and then condition is evaluated. In the worst case, in ESPOON,
the access request processing can take approximately up to 500
milliseconds. On the other hand, in ESPOONERBAC, a requester
first gets active in a role provided condition holds. The role
activation can take approximately up to 60 milliseconds for a
user that can get active in 5 roles. After the role activation, a
requester can be granted permissions assigned to its role. How-
ever, first the active role is searched in the session and then
the permission can be granted if the condition associated with
that permission holds. As we can see in Figure 14, grating
the permission takes up to 42 milliseconds. The reason why
ESPOONERBAC performance is better than that of ESPOON be-
cause (i) all possible conditions are enforced at the role activa-
tion time and (ii) introduction of roles simplified the roles and
permissions management.
We also consider the effect of role hierarchies on the
ESPOONERBAC performance. In a role hierarchy, we assume
that a role can inherit all permissions from its base role. This
simplifies the role management and permission assignment to
roles. In our experimentation, we consider 50 roles where each
role has 5 permissions. Furthermore, there is a role hierarchy
graph containing 25 roles, which is necessary for finding in-
heritance relationship between roles. Figure 14 shows a very
slight performance gain to evaluate the access request in case
of role hierarchy in ESPOONERBAC. Since the permission can
be associated with base role, we need to traverse in the role
hierarchy graph to find base roles. The performance of travers-
ing in the role hierarchy graph is shown in Figure 14. Finally,
the requested permission is granted if associated even with any
base roles. The role hierarchy may improve performance but in
the worst case it incurs higher overhead. However, the perfor-
mance of ESPOONERBAC with role hierarchy is still better than
that of ESPOON.
9. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented the ESPOONERBAC archi-
tecture to support RBAC policies for outsourced environments.
Our approach separates the security policies from the actual en-
forcing mechanism while guaranteeing the confidentiality of
RBAC policies assuming the SP is honest-but-curious. The
main advantage of our approach is that RBAC policies are en-
crypted but it still allows the PDP to perform the policy eval-
uation without revealing contents of requests or policies. Sec-
ond, ESPOONERBAC is capable of handling complex contextual
conditions involving non-monotonic boolean expressions and
range queries. Finally, the authorised users do not share any
encryption keys making the process of key management very
scalable. Even if a user key is deleted or revoked, the other en-
tities are still able to perform their operations without requiring
re-encryption of RBAC policies.
As future directions of our research, we are working on inte-
grating a secure audit mechanism in ESPOONERBAC. The mech-
anism should allow the SP to generate genuine audit logs with-
out allowing the SP to get information about both the data and
the policies. However, an auditing authority must be able to re-
trieve information about who accessed the data and what policy
was enforced for any access request made. Another direction of
our work is towards the extension of the encrypted search and
match capabilities to handle the case of negative authorisation
policies and policies for long-lived sessions where the condi-
tions need to be continuously monitored and the attributes of
the request can be dynamically updated.
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